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published in(发表于) 2016/8/5 10:43:32
United States Mission reviews, good to the last drop: the sharing economy “monopoly“? ,

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United States Mission reviews, good to the last drop: the sharing economy "monopoly"? -Drops, Uber excellent step in China-IT information

Share is the current global regulatory challenges. In China, net about after winning the compliance challenge, followed by the voice of public opinion there Antimonopoly.

For the drops and steps merge, antitrust, the first question to answer is: how to divide up the market? For example, Minolta, the market, are carbonated Orange drinks, or carbonated drink, or drink? Different standards, derived from the size of the market and competition conditions are quite different. Sharing of new technologies developed economies also face this problem, different classification standards, the size of the market and competition situation is different.

"Mobile APP" market, what is "mobile phone" market, or the taxi market, also is the market? Telephone reservations for taxis, roadside Yang can be used as "mobile APP" competition?

Same as share rental market and take-out market there is this Division confused.

Short term rental market is mobile phones find accommodation, or online to find accommodation, and accommodation? Traditional network platforms such as ctrip, where to shop on their own, whether as competitors of the short term rental APP?

For takeout market, takeout APP market, what is a phone order, and ordering? Group merged with the public comments, is monopolizing the market? Customers to shop eat, whether as a "new America" competition?

Antitrust regulation in the past, is for specific goods and services, and now, under the condition of new technology, the situation has changed.

Platform is essentially an information service platform, it does not provide specific travel, accommodation, food and other products and services itself, but a way of discovering information products and services. Therefore, the platform competition, should consumers find other ways of information goods and services.

APP for mobile phones, the "on your phone see" corresponds to "see by the side of a car", "phone order" corresponds to "orders in the roadside waving."

Other than logically correspond to the clear, different information is discovered between certain characteristics of volume change, will also directly affect consumer choice, also showed that competition is occurring in "different pieces of information".

Now, consumers, even down to "taxi" this definition, in addition to mobile phone software, there is Yang and the roadside or in other ways. Although the market has shrunk, but roadside Yang is still a huge market. Roadside raised under the current level is still more convenient than mobile phone software. Is the only thing holding this convenient taxi licence market control. So, to some extent, increased dependence on mobile phone software, is Government control rather than merged. Conversely, when the Government let the control of taxi licence, we can ease the people APP for mobile monopoly concerns, this also proves that the "different way to find information" between the alternatives.

In addition to directly affect consumer choice, and find information about the various ways of prices will affect consumer choice. Mobile APP prices for travelers, and roadside raised differences between prices, will have a direct impact on consumer choice. That's why subsidies work. Therefore, different information to find a way to price directly affects the consumer choices, it also proves that competition is happening in "discovery".

Along this line of thinking, "in the new APP found on some foods of America" corresponds to "see by the side directly into the"; "in short term rental platform from top to bottom order" corresponds to "ctrip and order", and "direct arrival accommodation".

In that case, you cannot individually to a particular "mode of discovery, purchase of goods and services" is defined as a single market. Too careful supervision, its logical basis is wrong, it will stifle the vitality of the market.

Take a step back and look, even if a separate designated "discover, purchase of goods and services" as a market, antitrust law's legal theory is also affected by economic challenges. The challenge will be more subtle and more profound.

In the traditional economy, a kind of monopoly is a duopoly. Such as Airbus and Boeing, Intel and AMD, Coca-Cola and Pepsi-Cola, Nike and adidas. In the market, these oligarchs with a certain degree of understanding among the competitors, they will not be intense competition in a challenging market situation. However, in sharing the economic mode, this situation difficult to maintain competition in the market is likely to go beyond this tacit understanding, reached higher levels of concentration.

First of all, in the traditional economic model, upgrading business models are: research and development, marketing, money, once again put into research and development, technology upgrading and marketing. The slow mode of technology upgrades, maximizing the profits of capital in order to make the research and development on the one hand, on the other hand, also need to be accumulated profits to invest in research and development. Internet, especially mobile Internet has brought a new "Finance-listing" mode, this mode, extreme dependence on market share. New technologies access to venture capital, and quickly put the most basic business model into reality, then, drive traffic and customers and then through several rounds of financing to expand, finally listed. Under this model, the winner, market share is critical, even beyond the profit the only important thing. In fact, this is not a theory but a reality.

Secondly, in the traditional economy, capacity building and exit is difficult. So, in the traditional economy, monopoly power is based on an important aspect of production capacity. Monopolist would deliberately reserved large capacity to deter rivals, for example, a nation that only 1 million TV sets sold each year, and some manufacturers buy the output of 2 million units of production lines, as a signal to deter rivals, the resulting monopoly.

However, in economic mode, the production capacity is shared between competitors. Registered driver can also sign up to the last drop-step, registering pigs short rent room also can register for Ant-short term rental, registered the Group of restaurants can also register you hungry. They are competitors of potential production capacity, and only requires a small subsidy, huge production capacity.

Third, consumers are also very easy to change. Once a company launched a new or greater concessions in a new APP on the phone, or for consumers to keep two of the same APP, and there is no significant cost. Participants small input, can also get a huge amount of consumers.

Therefore, assumes that the opponent is not input, minimal investment and production capacity was able to win a lot of consumers, bring huge changes in market share. Now a lot of people, including drivers and passengers, all dwell on subsidies, somehow, reflects this small investment in both ends of the production and consumption of large effect, and this effect in the "Finance-listing" mode, the temptation is great for market participants.

These three points together the necessary logic result, traditional economy, the duopoly means to deter rivals, tacitly, to some extent failed, under great temptation, the traditional understanding and equilibrium of duopoly is no longer stable. But shopping is ultimately a lose-lose, nor a rational market equilibrium, and the willingness of both sides to reach an agreement is so strong, for example, the media reported drops of and interaction between employees and the party, which reflected a willingness. However, interests, competitors in the market need to be more strongly and more credible pact to reach a tacit understanding with balance. The contract and the balance was merged to varying degrees, from common investors, to the ultimate fully merged.

So, merge is share economy competition equilibrium. Group merged with the public comments, and step drops and merge, are typical examples of competitive equilibrium in the market.

Anti-monopoly law does not at present severe restrictions to the duopoly, on the face of it, this is because the two participants in the market, there is competition, so no need to interfere too much. However, think about it, not hard to find, why two is a reasonable market, instead of having three or four? In fact, deeper economic reasons, because of duopoly, which itself is the result of market equilibrium, and is the best mode of competition. Therefore, the traditional legal principles of antitrust law, somehow, was in line with market equilibrium, that is, legal principle derived from market efficiency.

So, along this line of thinking, not hard to find, when the new technologies have changed the market equilibrium results, new anti-monopoly law jurisprudence has also been a challenge. How to cope with this change, is the result of new technology, access to markets and technology development efficiency, consumer welfare, or vice versa, stick to pay loss of market efficiency, consumer welfare and technology development costs is a challenge for regulators in the world.

To some extent, this challenge, first appeared in China, meaning China in new technologies, new economic development and innovation, and regulatory reform, leading the world. Conform to this courage to answer the question of the reform, it is an inevitable choice by halves. A possible, more intelligent way allow merging, but the strengthening of specific market conduct supervision.

Note: the writer is a researcher at the Shanghai Research Institute of finance and law. This personal view of the author only.


美团点评、滴滴优步:分享经济必然“垄断”吗? - 滴滴,Uber,优步中国 - IT资讯

分享经济是当下全球监管的挑战者。在中国,网约车赢得合规挑战之后,紧接着,社会舆论又出现了反垄断的呼声。

对于滴滴和优步的合并,是否构成垄断,首先需要回答的问题是:如何划分市场?比如,美年达,其所在的市场,到底是橙味碳酸饮料,还是碳酸饮料,还是饮料?不同的标准,推导出来的市场规模与竞争状况截然不同。新技术发展出来的分享经济也同样面临这个问题,划分标准不同,市场规模与竞争状况也就截然不同。

手机招车APP”所在的市场,到底是“手机出行”市场,还是出租车市场,还是出行市场?电话预定出租车,路边扬招能否作为“手机招车APP”的竞争对手?

同样作为分享经济的短租市场与外卖市场也存在这种划分困惑。

短租所在的市场,是手机寻找住宿,还是网络寻找住宿,还是住宿?传统的携程、去哪儿等网络平台以及自行到店,能否作为短租APP的竞争对手?

对于外卖市场,外卖APP所在的市场,到底是手机点餐,还是点餐?美团与大众点评合并了,是否垄断了餐饮市场?顾客自行到店用餐,能否作为“新美大”的竞争对手?

过去的反垄断监管,是针对具体的商品与服务的,而如今,新的技术条件下,情况也随之发生了变化。

平台本质上是一个信息中介服务平台,它提供的不是具体的出行、住宿、食品等产品与服务本身,而是一种发现产品与服务的信息的方式。所以,平台对应的竞争对手,应该是消费者发现商品与服务的信息的其他方式。

对于手机招车APP而言,“在手机上看到有车”对应于“在路边看到有车”;“在手机上下订单”对应于“在路边招手下订单”。

除了逻辑上清晰的对应关系之外,不同信息发现方式之间的某些特征量的变动,也会直接影响消费者的选择,也证明了竞争是发生于“不同的信息方式”之间。

实际上现在,消费者出行,即便缩小到“出租车出行”这一定义,除了手机软件,还有电招与路边扬招等方式。虽然电招市场已经极度萎缩,但路边扬招市场依然庞大。路边扬招在当前的技术水平下,仍然比手机软件更为方便。唯一阻碍这个方便的是出租车市场的牌照管制。所以,在某种程度上,加重人们对手机软件的依赖的,是政府的管制而非合并。反过来说,当政府放开对出租车牌照的管制,就能缓解人们对手机APP垄断的忧虑,这也证明了“不同发现信息方式”之间的替代性。

除了方便程度直接影响消费者的选择,发现信息的各种途径的价格也会影响消费者的选择。手机APP的出行价格,与路边扬招的出行价格之间的差异,就会直接影响到消费者的选择。这也是补贴能起作用的原因。所以,不同的信息发现方式的价格直接影响消费者的选择,这也证明了竞争是发生在“信息发现方式”之间。

顺着这个思路,“在新美大APP上发现某款食品”对应于“在路边看到直接进入”;“在短租平台上下订单”对应于“在携程上下订单”,以及“直接到店住宿”。

既然如此,就不能单独地把一种特定的“发现、购买商品与服务的方式”定义为一个单独的市场。过于细致的监管,其逻辑基础是错误的,也会扼杀市场的活力。

退一步看,即便单独划定“发现、购买商品与服务的方式”作为一个市场,反垄断法的法理也受到分享经济的挑战。这一挑战,将更加隐蔽,也更加深远。

传统经济中,常见的一种垄断形式是双寡头垄断。比如波音与空客,Intel与AMD,可口可乐与百事可乐,耐克与阿迪达斯。在市场中,这些寡头竞争对手之间有着某种程度上的默契,他们不会剧烈挑战市场的竞争现状。但是,在分享经济的模式下,这种局面很难维持,市场竞争很可能超越这种默契,达到更高的集中程度。

首先,传统经济模式中,技术升级的商业模式是:研发、销售、赚钱、再次投入研发、技术升级,销售。这种缓慢的技术升级模式,一方面是资本为了使研发的利润最大化,另一方面,也需要积累利润来投入研发。互联网、特别是移动互联网带来了新的“融资-上市”模式,而这种模式,对市场份额极端依赖。新技术获得风投,迅速把最基本的商业模式变为现实,然后,吸引流量与客户,随后再通过几轮融资扩大规模,最后上市。这种模式之下,赢家通吃,市场份额变得至关重要,甚至是超越盈利的唯一重要之事。实际上,这不是理论推导,而是现实。

其次,在传统经济中,生产能力的建立与退出,都是困难的。所以,在传统经济中,垄断能力是以生产能力为基础的一个重要方面。垄断者会故意预留较大的生产能力来阻吓对手,比如,某国每年仅有100万台电视机的销量,而某厂家购买了200万台产量的生产线,作为一种信号,阻吓对手,由此产生垄断。

不过,在分享经济的模式中,竞争对手之间是共享生产能力的。注册滴滴的司机也可以注册优步,注册小猪短租的房间也可以注册蚂蚁短租,注册美团的餐馆也可以注册饿了么。他们同时都是竞争对手的潜在生产能力,而参与者只需要投入较小的补贴,即可获取巨大的生产能力。

第三,消费者也是极易变动的。一旦某一家推出了新的或更大的优惠,在手机上新增加一个APP,或者保持两个同质的APP对消费者来说,并没有太大的成本。参与者较小的投入,也能获得巨量的消费者。

所以,假定对手不投入,极小的投入就能同时获得巨大的消费者与生产能力,带来巨大的市场份额变动。现在很多人,包括司机与乘客,都对补贴念念不忘,某种程度上,正反映了这种较小投入在生产与消费两端的巨大效果,而这个效果,在“融资—上市”的模式下,对市场参与者的诱惑是巨大的。

这三点结合在一起的必然逻辑结果就是,传统经济中,双寡头阻吓对手、达成默契的手段,在某种程度上失灵了,在巨大的诱惑之下,传统的双寡头垄断的默契与均衡不再稳定。但血拼终究是双输,也不是理性的市场均衡,而竞争双方对达成契约的意愿是如此强烈,例如,媒体报道的滴滴与优步的员工之间的交往与聚会,正是这一意愿的具体反映。但是,利益之下,市场上的竞争者需要更加强烈、更加可信的契约来达成默契与均衡。而这个契约与均衡,就是不同程度上的合并,从共同的投资人,到最终极的完全合并。

所以,合并是分享经济模式下市场竞争的均衡结果。美团与大众点评的合并,滴滴与快的与优步的合并,都是这个市场竞争均衡的典型例子。

当前各国反垄断法没有对双寡头垄断做出严厉的限制,从表面上看,这是因为市场上有两个参与者,竞争是存在的,所以,不需要过多干涉。但是,稍微思索一下,不难发现,为什么市场上有两家就是合理的,而不是必须有三家,或者四家呢?实际上,深层次的经济原因,是因为双寡头垄断,本身是市场均衡的结果,是竞争的最佳模式。所以,传统的反垄断法的法理,某种程度上,是符合市场博弈均衡的,也就是说,法理源于市场效率。

那么,顺着这个思路,不难发现,当新技术改变了市场博弈均衡的结果时,反垄断法的法理也受到了新的挑战。如何应对这个变化,是顺应新技术,获得市场与技术发展效率、消费者福利,还是相反,墨守成规,付出损失市场效率与技术发展、消费者福利的代价,是全球监管者面临的一个挑战。

在某种程度上来说,这种挑战首先在中国出现,意味着中国在新技术、新经济的发展与创新以及监管改革上,领先全球。顺应这种改革的勇气回答接下来的问题,就是一个不可半途而废的必然选择。一个可能的,也更加睿智的方式就是,允许合并,但加强具体的市场行为监管。

注:作者是上海金融与法律研究院研究员。本文仅代表作者个人观点。






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